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 Ye Zhang

/je/

Assistant Professor in Finance
Stockholm School of Economics 

About

Welcome! I am currently an Assistant Professor in the Finance Department at Stockholm School of Economics and ​also an Eva and Mats Qviberg Research Fellow at SHOF after finishing my Ph.D. at Columbia University in 2021 and my undergraduate study at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) in 2015. â€‹

My research explores topics related to empirical corporate finance, especially entrepreneurial finance, by using multidisciplinary research methods. In particular, I enjoy designing field and lab-in-the-field experiments to study important entrepreneurship and finance-related questions. These experiments, similar to art, help people understand the world while providing their designers with enough freedom and space for imagination. 

Research Interest: Entrepreneurial Finance, Field Experiments, Sustainable Investment, Real Estate  

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Research

Working Papers

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1. "Matching and Bargaining in Entrepreneurial Finance: Evidence From an Experimental Systemwith Mehran Ebrahimian

Presentation: WFA (2023), NBER SI Entrepreneurship (2023), â€‹EFA (2023), NFA (2023), AEF (2022), ENTFIN (2022), FMA Asia Pacific Conference (2022), IFN (2023), IBEFA (2023), FMA Europe (2023), HBS Seminar (2023)

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Abstract: Matching and bargaining have significant welfare implications in financial markets. Using real-stakes experiments with US venture capitalists (VCs) and startups, alongside real-world portfolio data, we estimate a search-and-matching model with bargaining to examine payoffs from collaborations. Agents with predetermined appealing characteristics gain more bargaining power in equilibrium, leading to substantial variation in payoff splits across heterogeneous deals, ranging from 2:1 to 1:2 between a startup and a VC. Consequently, having smaller payoff shares offsets agents' benefits from collaborating with appealing counterparties. Overall, this paper highlights that bargaining is the key factor in determining agents' benefits from matching in entrepreneurial finance.

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2. "Discrimination In the Venture Capital Industry: Evidence from Field Experiments"

Reject and Resubmit the Journal of Finance

Presentation: HEC Paris Entrepreneurship Workshop (2021), NFN Young Scholars Workshop (2021), SFA (2022), HKUST (2021), UW Foster (2021), SSE (2021), Warwick (2021), CUHK Shenzhen (2021), University of Gothenburg (2022), EasternFA (2023), CES North America Conference (2023), EFA (2024)

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Abstract:  This paper examines discrimination by early-stage US investors based on startup founders' gender and race using complementary field experiments. Consistent with the prediction of discrimination theories, results show that investors implicitly discriminate against women and Asians when evaluating attractive startups but favor them when evaluating struggling startups. Among multiple coexisting sources of discrimination identified, statistical discrimination and implicit discrimination are important reasons for investors' ``anti-minority'' behaviors. A novel consistent estimator is developed to measure the polarization of investors’ discrimination behaviors and their separate driving forces. Furthermore, gender homophily exists when investors provide anonymous encouragement to startup founders.

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3. "Investor Expertise and Private Investment Selection" with Shane Miller, and Emmanuel Yimfor

Revise and Resubmit the Journal of Financial Economics

Presentation: Michigan Ross Business School Seminar (2024), Stockholm School of Economics Brown Bag (2025), U.S. SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) 2025, the 2025 Midwest Finance Association (MFA) meetings, the Private Capital Symposium (London,2025), the Private Equity Research Consortium (PERC) Conference (2024), the Institute for Private Capital Online Symposium (2025).

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​​Abstract: Despite the remarkable growth of individual investors in private markets, little is known about their investment patterns. We test the impact of investor expertise on venture capital fund selection by conducting an experiment with limited partners. By fixing access to investment opportunities, we isolate fund selection behavior. We compare the selections of professional and individual investors. Both groups aim to select highperforming funds but differ in their beliefs about which fund managers (GPs) deliver high returns. Professionals prefer GPs with strong past returns, while individuals favor GPs with elite educational backgrounds, but place less emphasis on past performance. Our estimates suggest that fund selection alone could explain 20% of the difference in returns between professionals and individuals.

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4. “ESG Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Perceptions and Preferences” with Eric Zou â€‹

Supersedes two earlier working papers "Impact Investing and Venture Capital Industry: Experimental Evidence" and "Startups' Strategies for ESG Funding Adoption"

Best Paper Awards (ESG) at SWFA Annual Conference 2023, Best Paper Awards at SFA Annual Conference 2023, Vinnova Funding Grants 2022

Presentation: WFA (2022), RBFC (2022), ABFER (2023), Active Management Research Symposium - ESG Investing in Private Markets (2022), the 1st Conference in Sustainable Finance at the University of Luxembourg (2022), Conference on Ageing and Sustainable Finance (2022), AsianFA Annual Conference (2022), FMA European Conference (2022), FMARC (2022), IFN (2022), the Fourth Israel Behavioral Conference (2022), Bayes Business School (2022), SFiC (2022), MISUM (2022), CICF (2023), WEFI (2023), Oxford Sustainable Private Markets Conference (2022), ​SFA (2023)the KWC/SNEE Conference on Sustainable Finance (2022), YSBC (2022), FMA Asia Pacific Conference (2022), SWFA (2023), FMA Europe (2024), WEAI (2024), AsianFA (2024)​​​

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​​Abstract:  We develop an experimental framework to identify the belief-based and taste-based drivers of demand for Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) partnerships. Our study implements two symmetric experiments with real startup founders and venture capital (VC) investors, who evaluate hypothetical profiles under the understanding that their responses will inform an algorithm generating personalized real-world matches. We find a significant ESG penalty: profiles randomly labeled with ESG attributes receive lower interest from both founders and VCs. This penalty is primarily driven by negative performance beliefs—ESG-labeled profiles are perceived as less profitable and less accessible. To isolate taste-based preferences, we further implement a willingness-to-pay experiment in which participants may forgo part of a lottery reward to receive additional match recommendations of identical quality. Participants randomly offered ESG-oriented recommendations are significantly more likely to pay, revealing a latent preference for ESG once performance concerns are held constant. These findings highlight a tension between financial returns and personal values: in current market conditions, concerns about profitability obscure an underlying taste for ESG. 

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5. "Two-sided Discrimination in an Entrepreneurial Financing Setting: Experimental and Theoretical Evidence" with Junlong Feng, Ofir Gefen, Weijie Zhong

Research Funding from Stanford GSB

2024 Academy of finance Best in Track Plaque

Presentation: AEA Poster (2022), Columbia Experimental Design Workshop (2022), ABFER (2024), World Finance Conference (2024), FMA Europe (2024), Italy Global Finance Conference (2024), Abu Dhabi World Finance Confernece (2024), SMS (2024), Academy of Finance Conference (2024), ABFE (2024)  

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Abstract: This paper investigates discrimination within two-sided matching markets, focusing specifically on the entrepreneurial financing market. Through an experiment involving real US startup founders, we identify the presence of statistical gender discrimination against female investors among startup founders. Specifically, female investors' signals are perceived as less informative compared to those of male investors. This discrimination is predominantly driven by male founders and disproportionately affects high-quality female investors, indicating the presence of both gender homophily and a glass ceiling effect for women in this domain. Interestingly, Asian investors do not face similar levels of discrimination. Building upon these experimental findings, we develop a novel search and matching model with endogenously information aggregation and belief formation. This theoretical framework demonstrates how statistical discrimination arises endogenously within two-sided matching markets, leading to the observed glass ceiling effect and perpetuating a persistent low female participation rate in entrepreneurial financing. Overall, this paper offers novel insights into the nature and distinct characteristics of discrimination within two-sided matching markets.
 

6. "Do Rounding-Off Heuristics Matter? Evidence from Bilateral Bargaining in the U.S. Housing Market" with Haaris Mateen, Franklin Qian, and Tianxiang Zheng

Supersedes the paper "The Microstructure of U.S. Housing Market: Evidence from Millions of Bargaining Interactions" 2021 with Haaris Mateen, Franklin Qian 

Presentation: Atlanta Fed (2022), Columbia Experimental Design Workshop (2023), AREUEA Annual Conference (2024), Yale Junior Finance Conference (2023)

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​​Abstract: Using confidential offer-level data on the US housing market, this paper examines rounding-off heuristics in the bilateral bargaining process. We demonstrate that home sellers and home buyers follow different rounding-off heuristics. Sellers' list prices cluster more frequently around charm numbers (e.g. 349,999) compared to buyers' offer prices and negotiated final sales prices which have relatively more salient round numbers. These charm list prices dominate round list prices by yielding a higher sales price and a shorter time on the market. Buyer counteroffers are driven by seller list price choices -- buyers are more likely to respond to a round/charm list price with an offer price at the corresponding rounding level with trivial adjustments. However, when sellers use round numbers as initial list prices, buyers are relatively more likely to use offer prices with greater counteroffer adjustments. These empirical findings provide novel insights into bilateral bargaining behavior in the U.S. housing market. We provide plausible mechanisms for our results.

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Teaching
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wusong

Instructor:    Climate Finance                                                     Fall 2023

                       

                       Sustainable Finance                                               Fall 2022    

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                       FinTech (Digitalization in Finance)                      Spring 2022, 2023

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                       Corporate Finance                                                 Summer 2018 

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LTF:              Economics Department Lead Teaching Fellow     2018- 2019

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Acknowledgement

These digital paintings are designed to show my deepest acknowledgements to my advisors for their guidance and protection when I almost gave up. Thanks also go to our academic community and entrepreneurial community for their feedback and support.       

                                                                                         

                                                                                                           -Ye

©2020 by YE ZHANG

Last updated: 03/2023 

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